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Thoughts on Smith and Religious-Group Autonomy 
Laura S. Underkuffler ∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Reconciling the federal constitutional guarantee of religious free 
exercise1 with the collective interests of civil society has long been a 
difficult problem for First Amendment jurisprudence. For many 
years, the United States Supreme Court protected claimed religious 
exercise if it was required by a central religious belief, was 
substantially burdened by government action, and was not 
outweighed by a compelling state interest.2 The last prong of this 
test, in particular, afforded substantial protection to claimed religious 
exercise when pitted against state laws.3
In Employment Division v. Smith,4 decided little more than a 
decade ago, the Court abruptly shifted course. Citing the dangers 
posed to societal norms by claimed religious exemptions, the Court 
held that the government need only show that a challenged law has 
no “antireligious bias,” that is, that religious and nonreligious 
individuals and actions are treated equally in intention and effect. If a 
law is “neutral” in this sense, the fact that it incidentally burdens 
religious conduct presents no First Amendment problem.5
The holding in Smith—essentially, that religious exercise has no 
special rights or immunity from “neutral, generally applicable 
law[s]”6—sits uneasily with another longstanding doctrinal fixture, 
∗  Professor, Duke University School of Law.
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 2. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Thomas v. Review Bd., 
450 U.S. 707, 717–19 (1981). 
 3. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that religious beliefs 
requiring the discontinuance of a child’s education after the eighth grade of elementary school 
must be given precedence over the state’s competing interest in universal childhood 
education). 
 4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 5. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–90; Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449–52 (1988). 
 6. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
3UND-FIN 12/2/2004 10:53 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
1774 
 
namely, that of “religious-group autonomy.” This doctrine, which 
has developed in a piecemeal fashion over the years, generally holds 
that religious groups and institutions are exempt from secular state 
interference in their selection of clergy, internal doctrinal and 
property disputes, and other matters that affect their internal 
organization and internal relations.7 As Professor Perry Dane states 
in his contribution to this Conference, areas of claimed autonomous 
exercise “rang[e] from classic church property disputes to more 
recently developing questions over the extent to which various 
regulatory regimes, including labor law, civil rights law, and even 
malpractice, defamation, and contract law, should be permitted to 
intervene in the internal relations of religious institutions and 
communities.”8
Thus, the question that immediately arises is this: If religious 
individuals are precluded by Smith from claiming broad immunity 
from civil laws and civil courts, can religious groups and institutions 
continue to claim that immunity, under the doctrine of religious-
group autonomy? 
The theoretical grounding for the doctrine of religious-group 
autonomy in Supreme Court jurisprudence is far from clear. 
Although the Court has often discussed religious-group autonomy in 
terms that echo First Amendment values,9 the Court has never 
 7. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976) 
(stating that civil courts must defer to church tribunals on matters of purely ecclesiastical 
concern, such as disputes over church discipline, choice of clergy, and diocesan 
reorganization); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 
94, 116 (1952) (stating that in the context of a church property dispute, religious 
organizations are entitled to “a spirit of freedom . . . , an independence from secular control 
and manipulation . . . , [and] power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, 
matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine”); Watson v. Jones, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1872) (stating that in the context of a church property dispute, 
courts must defer to religious tribunals on “questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical 
rule, custom, or law”). 
 8. Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, 1733–34 (footnotes 
omitted). For examples of more far-flung claims, see Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton 
Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (claimed exemption from state civil rights laws); 
Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999) (claimed exemption from the Americans 
with Disabilities Act); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(claimed exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act); St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp. v. NLRB, 
708 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1983) (claimed exemption from the National Labor Relations Act). 
 9. See, e.g., Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 110 (the idea of church autonomy is grounded in a 
“rule of separation between church and state”); Watson, 80 U.S. at 730 (“‘The structure of 
our government has . . . rescued . . . temporal institutions from religious interference . . . [and] 
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directly addressed the scope of free exercise protections when 
government interferes with religious-group affairs.10 It is therefore 
difficult to deduce, as a matter of doctrinal logic, the extent to which 
the Smith decision undermines the foundations of the doctrine of 
religious-group autonomy. To the extent that religious-group 
autonomy is intended to prevent secular meddling in religious 
doctrines, ecclesiastical disputes, and other strictly internal affairs—
questions in which the secular state has no stake—the logic of Smith 
may well leave the doctrine of religious-group autonomy untouched. 
If, however, religious-group autonomy is extended to include 
immunity from secular laws and secular policies, then its claims, and 
Smith’s seeming subordination of religious exercise to “neutral 
laws,” appear to be on a collision course.11
In their very interesting and provocative contributions to this 
Conference, Professors Perry Dane and Kathleen Brady attempt an 
answer to this question that refutes the simple assertion of Smith’s 
supremacy in cases involving conflicts between group free exercise 
claims and “neutral, generally applicable laws.” In different ways, 
they attempt to establish why the Smith rule—which cuts far back on 
the idea of religious-individual autonomy—does not necessarily have 
the same impact on the claims of religious groups. Under Professor 
Dane’s approach, Smith should be seen as primarily concerned with 
the problem of the “subjective” and “idiosyncratic” nature of 
individual free exercise exemptions—a problem that, he argues, 
religious-group autonomy does not involve.12 Under Professor 
Brady’s approach, religious-group autonomy survives Smith because 
of its particular value for free religious exercise, which Smith 
explicitly upholds.13
secured religious liberty from the invasion of civil authority.’” (quoting Harmon v. Dreher, 17 
S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87, 120 (1843))). 
 10. See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise, 2004 BYU L. 
REV. 1633, 1635. 
 11. Professor Dane argues that because Smith cites certain religious-group autonomy 
cases approvingly, the survival of this doctrine post-Smith is indicated. See Dane, supra note 8, 
at 1716–17. However, all of the cases cited in Smith dealt with the government’s need to 
refrain from involvement in internal religious disputes over ecclesiastical powers or dogma. See 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 696; Presbyterian 
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); 
Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 94). In such cases, the secular state has little interest. None dealt with the 
central question in Smith, that is, religious exemptions from “otherwise neutral” state laws. 
 12. See Dane, supra note 8, at 1722–32. 
 13. See Brady, supra note 10, at 1677–79. 
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Although their efforts are quite heroic and attractive in many 
ways, I shall argue that they are, in the end, unconvincing. Whether 
Smith’s core concern is believed to be the problem of individual, 
nonreviewable, legal-definitional power, or the erosion of civil 
norms, there is no convincing basis for distinguishing individual 
religious exemptions, struck down in Smith, from aggressive forms of 
religious-group autonomy. Nor is the ideal of individual religious 
freedom necessarily furthered by the broad immunity of religious 
groups from civil laws. While religious groups may be places that 
nurture and sustain individual religious belief, they may also be 
hostile, bitter places, which wield coercive and oppressive power. 
I have never been a fan of the Smith opinion. It is my view that 
freedom of religion—or freedom of conscience, as I have defined 
it—has very distinct value, which is recognized in our constitutional 
scheme.14 By affording individual religious exercise no special 
protection, Smith denies this principle. However, frustration with 
Smith should not blind us to the deep problems that an aggressive 
vision of religious-group autonomy presents. The prospect of 
religious groups with broad, autonomous power poses special 
dangers, both to dissenting individuals and to the goals of 
government, which should impel us to view it cautiously. Indeed, 
our reservations about the supremacy of religious claims should, if 
anything, be stronger when we consider the claims of religious 
groups. 
II. SMITH AND RELIGIOUS-GROUP EXEMPTIONS FROM 
“OTHERWISE NEUTRAL” LAWS 
In his article, “Omalous” Autonomy, Professor Dane argues that 
religious-group autonomy—or a special, constitutionally required, 
protective regime for religious institutions—survives Smith’s 
rejection of just such a regime for individual assertions of free 
religious exercise. Smith is not, in his view, the devastating case for 
the idea of religious-group autonomy that one might believe. 
Rather, Professor Dane sees “institutional autonomy [as] . . . 
 14. See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Religious Guarantees in a Pluralistic Society: 
Values, Problems, and Limits, 12 SA PUBLIEKREG 32, 46–47 (1997); Laura S. Underkuffler-
Freund, Yoder and the Question of Equality, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 789, 800–02 (1996); Laura S. 
Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational 
Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 965–68 (1995). 
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consistent with Smith, not only in a narrow, technical sense, but also 
with respect to the bedrock principle for which Smith stands.”15
Professor Dane builds his argument in the following way. The 
Court’s real concern in Smith, he argues, was not that religious 
believers might be immune from civil law. Rather, the concern was 
about how that immunity would be established.16 Under pre-Smith 
free exercise jurisprudence, religious believers were granted 
immunity from civil law based on their own determinations of their 
religious beliefs. This system of “exemptions” troubled the Court. 
Because judges are unable to disagree with the sincerity or 
substantive truth of individual assertions of free religious exercise,17 
the pre-Smith rule effectively conferred a “private right to ignore 
generally applicable laws.”18 It permitted “every citizen to become a 
law unto himself.”19 It violated an “essentially jurisprudential 
concern” about what the rule of law should mean.20
A system of religious-group autonomy, on the other hand, does 
not involve this objectionable feature. In this framework, general 
categories of activities are established by law as those in which 
religious groups may act autonomously. These categories are 
“discrete, defined, . . . predictable,” and applicable to all.21 They are 
not exemptions from law; they are provisions of law. They are 
grounded in “objective, if contingent and contextual, social fact and 
not merely in the subjective, idiosyncratic, claims of individuals.”22 
Thus, the problem of “individual religious prerogative,” which drove 
the Court’s decision in Smith, is not present in this context. 
This is an argument that deserves careful evaluation. Of course, 
the assertion that Smith is more concerned about the way in which 
individual religious exemptions are established than about the effect 
 15. Dane, supra note 8, at 1721. 
 16. See id. at 1722–24. 
 17. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within the 
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular [religious] beliefs or practices to a faith, or 
the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds”); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 
U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or 
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”).  
 18. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990). 
 19. Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 
98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)). 
 20. Dane, supra note 8, at 1722. 
 21. Id. at 1735. 
 22. Id. at 1727. 
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of religiously based exemptions on “otherwise neutral laws” is, in 
itself, a controversial one. Let us assume, however, that the 
placement of legal-definitional power in individual hands is, in fact, 
the core concern of the Smith opinion. Is this problem avoided by 
the doctrine of religious-group autonomy? Are the areas of 
autonomy that this doctrine creates “discrete, defined, and 
predictable” applications of law—applicable, even-handedly, to 
people whom the law objectively specifies? 
As Professor Brady points out, religious-group autonomy is 
understood by courts and commentators in different ways. For 
instance, under one understanding, religious organizations are 
entitled only to exemptions from secular laws that actually burden 
religious practice.23 Under a broader understanding, government 
may not interfere with internal church affairs, regardless of whether 
the activities affected are religious in nature or more mundane 
administrative matters.24
If religious-group autonomy is understood in the first sense—if it 
is understood to confer exemption from secular laws that actually 
burden religious practice—then it is no more immune from 
subjective, idiosyncratic, nonreviewable decisionmaking than are the 
individual religious exemptions condemned in Smith. Consider, for 
instance, claimed religious-group exemptions from labor laws, tort 
laws, civil rights laws, and so on. The fact that we might specify the 
particular areas of autonomy permitted (for example, freedom from 
these laws in employee relations, if required by religious dictates) 
does not eliminate the definitional power that religious groups enjoy. 
What are the beliefs of this religious group? Why does the law in 
question burden religious practice? Under this formulation, the 
problem of “individual religious prerogative,” argued to be the core 
of Smith, is simply traded for “group religious prerogative.” There is 
no substantive difference, in this context, between: 
• I am exempt because my religious beliefs conflict with “law X,”  
 and 
• we are exempt because our religious beliefs conflict with “law X.” 
 23. Brady, supra note 10, at 1635. 
 24. Id.  
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In both cases, the existence or nonexistence of the legally 
recognized exemption depends upon a subjective, idiosyncratic, 
nonreviewable decision: the religious beliefs that the individual—or 
individuals—assert. 
Suppose, however, that we understand religious-group 
autonomy differently. Suppose that we understand it in the second 
way described above: that government may not interfere with 
internal church affairs, regardless of whether the activities are 
religious in nature or mundane administrative matters. For instance, 
we could recognize areas of religious-group autonomy as follows: 
• The decisions of religious organizations about the selection 
and retention of employees shall be beyond the reach of civil 
rights laws and other civil laws,  
 or 
• secular courts will not become involved in religious 
organizations’ internal affairs. 
Would an understanding of spheres of autonomy along these lines 
avoid the problem of idiosyncratic, subjective, nonreviewable 
decisionmaking? 
One could certainly apply such laws without probing the 
particular religious beliefs of the claiming groups, since any religious 
organization that makes the claim would presumably be entitled to 
the exemptions. The exemptions are indeed universal, in that sense. 
Here one must pause. What we have effectively done is to 
substitute status (as a “religious group”) for beliefs as the critical, 
qualifying issue. If individuals have the requisite status as a religious 
group or organization, then the exemption is granted. If they do not 
have that status, then the exemption is denied. 
Religious-group status may seem, at first blush, to be a more 
objectively defined qualification than individually held religious 
beliefs. However, religious-group status is itself a function of 
individuals’ asserted understandings of their own (religious) 
organizations, and thus—derivatively—of their own religious beliefs. 
If five people declare themselves to be the New Assembly of God, 
and thus a religious group entitled to autonomy, can the secular 
authority challenge that assertion? If three business partners assert 
themselves to be devoutly religious individuals, and their sports and 
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health club business to be their “ministry,”25 can the secular 
authority deny their sincerity? In fact, by choosing to be—or not to 
be—a “religious group” or “organization,” as the exemption 
demands, individuals retain the same idiosyncratic, subjective, 
nonreviewable power that they enjoyed under the pre-Smith system 
of individual religious exemptions. In neither case can the state 
second-guess what is, or is not, a religiously based imperative. In 
neither case can the state second-guess the sincerity of individual 
religious beliefs. 
Thus, the employment of a broad understanding of religious-
group autonomy—one that simply denies government the right to 
interfere with a religious group’s internal affairs, regardless of their 
(religious or nonreligious) nature—does not avoid the problem of 
individual, idiosyncratic, nonreviewable decisionmaking: that power 
remains an inherent part of religious-group status, on which this 
understanding of autonomy depends. In addition, the claim that 
giving carte blanche, unqualified exemptions to religious 
organizations will eliminate individually discretionary elements can 
only hope to be true if the exempted activity itself is framed in very 
narrow and concrete terms. Grants of religious-group autonomy that 
are very limited in nature—for instance, autonomy in “hiring” or 
“property disputes”—may avoid discretionary elements. But grants 
of autonomy that are broad in any way—for instance, “freedom from 
secular state interference in internal religious affairs”—simply retain, 
in another guise, the same discretionary elements, and the same 
exemptions regime. 
In sum, granting religious groups autonomy for religious and 
nonreligious activities of a particular kind might obscure the problem 
of individual, religious-definitional authority, when the religious 
organization’s claim to existence is a noncontroversial one, and when 
the particular autonomy granted is narrowly defined. It does not, 
however, eliminate these issues, in either a theoretical or practical 
sense. 
Moreover, we remain, in the end, with a nagging awareness of 
the assumption with which this discussion began. Was it, in fact, the 
problem of individuals’ legal-definitional power that primarily 
 25. See, e.g., State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 
(Minn. 1985), appeal dismissed, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986) (claim by profitmaking corporation run 
by religiously oriented individuals for exemption from civil-rights laws). 
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troubled the Smith court? Or was it a deeper concern about the 
subjugation of civil laws and civil government to nonreviewable 
religious norms? 
If Smith’s concern was, instead, with the effect of religious 
exemptions on secular laws, then the idea of religious-group 
autonomy is seemingly in serious trouble. Whether exemptions are 
claimed by religious individuals or religious groups, their effects on 
the principle of uniform applicability of “neutral” laws are apparently 
identical. Although claims of religious-group autonomy might 
(under some formulations) be limited to particular settings or laws, 
at the end of the day the fact remains: the religious group is, because 
of its religious nature, exempt from laws that are clearly applicable to 
others. 
Perhaps the real question concerns the value of religious group 
autonomy—a question that Professor Dane’s article does not 
explicitly address. Is there, in fact, some particular characteristic of 
religious-group autonomy that makes it particularly compelling? Is 
there some reason to justify its retention, despite what Smith may 
seem to say? 
III. RELIGIOUS-GROUP AUTONOMY:  
MORE VALUABLE, OR MORE DANGEROUS? 
In her contribution to this Conference, Professor Brady argues 
that the doctrine of religious-group autonomy survives Smith 
because it furthers one of the very important principles that Smith 
upholds. Professor Brady begins with the observation that the 
Supreme Court has long upheld the value of religious belief and its 
protection by the First Amendment.26 Smith, she argues, continues 
this important recognition. “According to Smith, the ‘free exercise of 
religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess 
whatever religious doctrine one desires.’”27 Although religiously 
based action may be curtailed by government, “[i]n the realm of 
ideas, Smith envisions unrestricted freedom.”28
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“Freedom of thought, 
which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men.”). 
 27. Brady, supra note 10, at 1673 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
877 (1990)). 
 28. Id. at 1674. 
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In Professor Brady’s view, Smith’s unquestioned endorsement of 
the value and constitutional protection of religious belief has 
profound implications for the survival of religious-group autonomy 
in the post-Smith world. Numerous scholars have observed the 
intimate connection between religious groups and religious belief. 
“Individuals express and exercise their beliefs in religious 
communities, and religious organizations also play an essential role 
in shaping the beliefs that individuals hold.”29 Religious groups are, 
in many ways, more than simple aggregations of the beliefs or 
actions of their members. Religious groups create tradition; they “are 
part of an ongoing conversation which both shapes individuals and is 
shaped by them.”30 It is through living beliefs in a religious 
community that beliefs are exercised, refined, and reformed.31
Furthermore, Professor Brady argues:  
 If religious groups play an essential role in shaping individual 
religious belief and indeed in the very formulation of religious 
ideas, [then] the freedom of belief that Smith envisions requires 
protections for religious organizations. . . . Full freedom of belief is 
not possible without a corresponding right of religious groups to 
teach, develop, and practice their doctrines and ideas.32  
It is the doctrine of religious-group autonomy that affords religious 
groups this freedom. And because of the inherent difficulties 
involved in any secular inquiry into what religious beliefs are, or the 
extent to which they are sustained by groups, the “only effective and 
workable” solution is to grant a broad right of autonomy to religious 
groups that extends to all aspects of their affairs.33
Professor Brady candidly acknowledges that this approach will 
have costs.34 Granting religious groups autonomy will have costs in 
terms of the other, contrasting values and actions that the wider 
community wishes to promote. However, she argues that the 
opposition between religious-group autonomy and the 
implementation of democratic government is overdrawn. Religious 
groups, like all citizens’ groups, are important “for sustaining a well-
 29. Id. at 1675 (footnotes omitted). 
 30. Id. at 1676. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. at 1677. 
 33. Id. at 1698. 
 34. Id. at 1699. 
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functioning democratic order.”35 They are sources for moral values 
and recognition of responsibilities. They may act “[a]s training 
grounds for the exercise of democratic skills.”36
It is undoubtedly true that religious groups and institutions are 
important expressions of religious belief, and that they may add to 
the vibrancy of a liberal democratic society. However, in the 
particular context that we are considering, there are other, darker 
realities with which we must reckon. 
First, let us consider Professor Brady’s foundational assumption 
that religious groups “nurture and sustain” individual religious 
belief, making these groups deserving of protection from civil law. 
This case for religious-group autonomy is grounded in the idea that 
such groups are supportive and positive places for the expression and 
growth of individuals’ religious faith. 
Invoking this model, in this context, raises an immediate 
objection. The cases in which religious groups seek freedom from 
secular norms—for instance, the employment and labor relations 
cases that are Professor Brady’s focus37—involve not support, but 
conflict. In these cases, the religious group is not experienced by the 
aggrieved person as a warm, positive, nurturing place; it is 
experienced as a negative, hostile place, in which the religious group 
attempts to exert, on the individual, oppressive and coercive power. 
These situations involve disputes—bitter disputes; so bitter, in fact, 
that individuals seek recourse in civil laws and civil courts. In these 
situations, it is difficult to say that “vindicating individual religious 
beliefs” is obviously achieved by granting the religious groups 
complete, autonomous, and despotic power. What we have here is 
the clash of individual religious beliefs, the clash of individual 
religious values. 
We might well believe that when the “nurturing” model applies, 
our commitment to religious-group autonomy is justified. However, 
when this model does not apply, should we continue, blindly, to 
grant religious groups that status? Put another way, if nurturing 
individual religious belief is our goal, is there a reason why the 
religious beliefs and values of the many should necessarily prevail (in 
effect) over the religious beliefs and values of dissenters? There is a 
 35. Id. at 1700. 
 36. Id. at 1700–01. 
 37. See, e.g., id. at 1645. 
3UND-FIN 12/2/2004 10:53 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
1784 
 
tendency, by those who advocate religious-group autonomy, to 
focus on the needs of the target group and its members. What about 
the needs of the complainants? 
There are certain situations, of course, when an aggrieved 
individual’s recourse to civil laws and civil courts might—for other 
reasons—quite reasonably be denied. For instance, if the individual 
has voluntarily adopted the religious group’s understandings, values, 
and authority, it is reasonable to expect that those understandings, 
values, and authority will govern the dispute, to the exclusion of the 
civil courts. As the Supreme Court has stated, “decisions of proper 
church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting 
civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as 
conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract 
or otherwise.”38 This is no different from the effect given by civil 
courts to the determinations made by judicatory bodies established 
by clubs, civic associations, and other private consensual 
agreements.39 Indeed, this “contractarian” understanding of 
religious-group autonomy explains judicial deference in many 
intragroup disputes, such as those involving “ministerial,” “church 
property,” and other purely ecclesiastical matters. However, neither 
this contractarian theory nor the ideal of the “nurturing” group 
supports a broad, across-the-board presumption of religious-group 
autonomy in individual-recourse cases. 
Thus, the idea of individual benefit as the reason for an 
aggressive vision of religious-group autonomy is questionable at best. 
In addition, religious-group autonomy involves obvious costs for 
societal goals and values. We must remember the range of situations 
in which claims of religious-group autonomy can arise, even under 
more conservative formulations. For instance, it is often suggested 
that religious-group autonomy should be granted for the groups’ 
“internal operations.” Although this might seem like a limited grant, 
it could include fund-raising activities, the treatment of employees or 
prospective employees, the operation of religious schools, and more. 
Such “internal operations” of religious groups have frequent, serious, 
external effects on critically important societal goals and values. With 
the enforceability of civil rights laws, education standards, workplace 
safety rules, and other laws at issue, it is difficult to maintain that the 
 38. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929). 
 39. See id. at 16–17. 
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secular state has no vital interests at stake, or that religious groups 
should, in their internal operations, be “islands of autonomy.” 
For those who would go farther—and grant religious groups 
autonomy for all operations and all affairs—the list is even more 
daunting. For instance, a religious group could claim autonomy for 
its land-use decisions, or conflicts with zoning, environmental, and 
historic preservation laws; its commercial dealings with outside 
parties (for example, contractual disputes and antifraud laws); its 
political/lobbying activities, and conflicts with election laws and 
anticorruption laws; and more. The list is endless. It is particularly 
endless because we have not yet determined what those “religious 
groups,” entitled to autonomy, will be. As observed above, claims 
for exemption from civil laws on constitutional grounds have been 
asserted by religious groups as diverse as a religious foundation 
involved in commercial activities and a profitmaking enterprise run 
by religiously oriented individuals.40 Should all of them be 
autonomous in their operations, policies, and practices? 
Indeed, when we think positively of the prospect of religious 
groups as exempt from civil laws, we tend to imagine this power as 
exercised by traditional religious groups, whose activities we admire. 
What of the harder cases? What of groups who espouse and 
implement religious hatred, racial hatred, the subordination of 
women, the persecution of gay men and lesbians, or other beliefs 
abhorrent to civil society? If autonomy is given to some religious 
groups, it must, perforce, be given to all.41 Yet, we would hardly 
want the activities of all such groups to be protected, untouchable, 
“islands of autonomy.” 
Professor Brady acknowledges that even the “internal affairs” of 
religious groups can have substantial impacts upon the larger 
society—some quite negative—giving the state important regulatory 
interests.42 She argues, however, that “[f]ull freedom of belief, even 
 40. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); 
State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), appeal 
dismissed, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986). See generally, Laura S. Underkuffler, “Discrimination” on the 
Basis of Religion: An Examination of Attempted Value Neutrality in Employment, 30 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 581, 597–99 (1989). 
 41. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 658 (1943) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting) (stating that conferral of government benefits on particular religious groups 
would “resurrect the very discriminatory treatment of religion which the Constitution sought 
forever to forbid”). 
 42. See Brady, supra note 10, at 1699. 
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unpopular and unorthodox belief, is essential to the health of 
democratic society[,] as are the groups that make such beliefs 
possible.”43 If—by this—she means freedom of belief, and the right 
to associate with like believers, I concur wholeheartedly. In those 
limited areas, the democratic value of religious freedom clearly 
outweighs the discomfort experienced by others, which the existence 
of those beliefs may engender. Indeed, even when we consider 
exemptions for individual free exercise claims, under pre-Smith law, 
my sympathy with her position (on balance) continues. However, 
when we consider the question of religiously motivated conduct by 
religious groups, the stakes are much higher. With the religious strife 
and oppression that currently engulfs vast parts of the world, the 
view that religious groups should simply be left alone to do good 
works seems alarmingly inadequate. 
As I have stated elsewhere, I do not believe that religion is simply 
another philosophical or personal belief system that should, as a 
constitutional matter, be treated “equally” in the name of 
“equality.”44 I believe that religion is different, both in its unique 
power and value to individual lives and in its special dangers, when 
mixed with government. Those of us who believe in religion’s special 
value might not like Smith and thus be tempted to view any 
broadening of religious freedom, for individuals or groups, as some 
kind of victory. However, individual religious freedom under pre-
Smith doctrine was a far more limited and benign construct than a 
sweeping idea of religious-group autonomy. Religion, when 
“combined” in groups and institutions, wields tremendous social, 
economic, and political power. It carries far more dangers of 
oppression, coercion, and the assumption of governmental power 
than does individual free exercise. This does not mean that 
government should have the power to crush religious groups, or to 
dictate their truly internal affairs. But neither does it mean that we 
should grant these groups carte blanche, as societal actors, by 
granting them sweeping autonomy. 
 43. Id. at 1703. 
 44. See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler, Public Funding for Religious Schools: Difficulties and 
Dangers in a Pluralistic Society, 27 OXFORD REV. EDUC. 577, 583–88 (2001); Laura S. 
Underkuffler, The Price of Vouchers for Religious Freedom, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 463, 
476–77 (2001). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In summary, whether one believes Smith’s core concern is the 
problem of individual, nonreviewable, legal-definitional power, or 
the problem of the erosion of civil norms, there is no convincing 
basis for distinguishing individual religious exemptions, struck down 
in Smith, from aggressive forms of religious-group autonomy. 
“Religious groups” are constituted by the subjective beliefs and 
assertions of individuals, in a way that is no different from claims of 
individual religious exercise. And if we are concerned with the 
impotence of civil norms, in settings beyond those involving strictly 
internal and ecclesiastical questions, there is no difference if those 
norms are ignored by groups or if they are ignored by individuals. 
To sustain broad visions of religious-group autonomy in the 
shadow of Smith, we must find a positive reason for granting to 
religious groups what the Court denied, in Smith, to individuals. 
When considering a doctrinal development as radical as this, we must 
carefully consider its consequences. Religious groups, with 
autonomous power, pose far more dangers of individual oppression, 
governmental interference, and undermining of societal norms than 
autonomously acting individuals. In my view, granting religious 
groups sweeping freedom from civil laws carries with it far more 
costs than benefits. 
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